

STATE OF ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

Commonwealth Edison :
: Docket No. 14-0312
:
Annual formula rate update and revenue :
Requirement reconciliation under :
Section 16-108.5 of the Public Utilities Act :

**DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF MATTHEW WHITE
ON BEHALF OF THE RETAIL ENERGY SUPPLY ASSOCIATION**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. Please state your name and business address for the record.**

3 A. My name is Matthew White, and my business address is 6100 Emerald Parkway, Dublin
4 Ohio 43016.

5 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6 A. Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. d/b/a IGS Energy as the Manager of Regulatory and Legal
7 Affairs.

8 **Q. For whom are you appearing in this proceeding?**

9 A. The Retail Energy Supply Association (“RESA”). RESA is a non-profit trade
10 association of independent corporations that are involved in the competitive supply of
11 electricity and natural gas.¹ RESA and its members are actively involved in the
12 development of retail and wholesale competition in electricity and natural gas markets
13 throughout the United States.

14

15 **Q. Briefly describe your educational experience and relevant qualifications.**

16 A. I have a Juris Doctor (J.D.) and Masters in Business Administration (M.B.A.) from the
17 College of William & Mary. I also have a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) from Ohio University.
18 I started my legal career working at the law firm of Chester, Wilcox & Saxbe as an
19 energy and utilities lawyer. At Chester Wilcox, I participated in numerous regulatory

¹ RESA’s members include AEP Energy, Inc.; Champion Energy Services, LLC; ConEdison *Solutions*; Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.; Direct Energy Services, LLC; GDF SUEZ Energy Resources NA, Inc.; Homefield Energy; IDT Energy, Inc., Integrys Energy Services, Inc.; Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. d/b/a IGS Energy; Just Energy; Liberty Power; MC Squared Energy Services, LLC; Mint Energy, LLC; NextEra Energy Services; Noble Americas Energy Solutions LLC; NRG, Inc.; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC; Stream Energy; TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd.; and TriEagle Energy, L.P.. The comments expressed in this filing represent the position of RESA as an organization but may not represent the views of any particular member of RESA.

20 proceedings relating to utility matters, including natural gas and electric rate cases and
21 electric power siting cases. I also have worked on power and gas sales transactions. At
22 the beginning of 2011, I was hired into IGS Energy's rotation program where I spent the
23 next 16 months working in various different departments throughout the company
24 learning IGS' entire business, including the electric and gas supply and risk departments.
25 In 2012 I began full-time as an attorney in IGS' regulatory affairs department. In 2014 I
26 was promoted to Manager, Legal and Regulatory Affairs at IGS. In my current position I
27 manage the legal activities for IGS Energy at utilities commissions and other regulatory
28 bodies throughout the United States. My team is responsible for electric and natural gas
29 litigation for IGS Energy, including electric and natural gas rate cases and other
30 proceedings that relate to energy. I am also intimately involved in IGS Energy's advanced
31 electric generation and compressed natural gas (CNG) businesses. I currently serve on the
32 Board of Ohio Advanced Energy Economy ("OAE") a non-profit organization that
33 seeks to promote advanced energy development.

34 **Q. Have you provided testimony in utility regulatory proceedings before?**

35 A. Yes. I have submitted written testimony in the Duke Natural Gas Distribution Rate Case,
36 (Public Utilities Commission of Ohio "PUCO" Case No. 12-1685-GA-AIR); the DTE
37 2013-2014 Gas Cost Recovery case (Michigan Public Service Commission Case No. U-
38 17131); the Columbia Gas of Kentucky 2013 Distribution Rate Case (Kentucky Public
39 Service Commission Case No. 2013-00167); the Dayton Power & Light Company
40 Electric Security Plan Proceeding (PUCO Case No. 12-426-EL-SSO); and the Ohio
41 Power Company Electric Security Plan Proceeding (PUCO Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO).

42 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

43 A. In Commonwealth Edison’s (“ComEd”) Revenue-neutral rate design case (Case No. 13-
44 387), the Commission directed ComEd to provide in its next formula rate case an
45 embedded cost study identifying the amount of customer care costs that are allocable to
46 the supply function. In this proceeding, ComEd submitted three studies that recommend
47 that the Commission allocate little or no customer care costs to the supply function- only
48 one of which—the Allocation Study (ComEd Ex. 7.04)—can even be used as a starting
49 point for a proper analysis of allocating customer care costs to the supply function. My
50 testimony responds to these studies. I also propose corrections and adjustments to the
51 Allocation Study. Finally, I propose that certain other costs should be allocated to the
52 supply function.

53 **Q. Can you please further describe the three studies that ComEd submitted in this**
54 **case?**

55 A. ComEd has presented three studies with respect to customer care costs. Under the
56 Allocation Study, ComEd allocated \$12,137,711 to the supply function (ComEd Ex.
57 7.04). Under the Alternate Analysis (ComEd Ex. 7.06), which examined only customer
58 contact center costs, ComEd allocated \$4,710,594 to the supply function. Finally, under
59 the Switching Study (ComEd Ex. 7.05), ComEd allocated a *de minimis* amount of
60 \$112,343 to the supply function.

61 **Q. Do you support ComEd’s studies?**

62 A. As I discuss further below, I do not support the Switching Study and the Alternative
63 Study at all. With respect to the Allocation Study, I can support it as a starting point.
64 With my corrections, the Allocation Study supports approximately \$34 million of
65 customer care costs to be allocated to the supply function,-which is a conservative- but

66 acceptable level, until ComEd provides a better analysis based on fully embedded costs
67 as requested by the Commission in its order in Docket No.13-0387.

68 With respect to the Switching Study, its premise is fundamentally flawed, and it is not an
69 embedded cost study, as requested by the Commission. It should be rejected.

70 The Alternative Study is inappropriate and unreasonably limited to one type of cost,
71 thereby producing a result that is unreasonable on its face. It should be rejected.

72 As I stated previously, the Allocation Study provides an adequate starting point for a cost
73 allocation analysis. As corrected for the reasons set forth in my testimony, and as
74 demonstrated in RESA Ex. MW 1.1, the Allocation Study produces an amount of
75 approximately \$34 million that should be allocated to the supply function. Until ComEd
76 produces a better, fully embedded cost study, I recommend that the Commission allocate
77 a minimum of \$34 million to the supply function.

78 In addition, ComEd's studies only account for operation and maintenance ("O&M") costs
79 that relate to the customer care function. However, as I explain in my testimony there are
80 a number of other non-O&M costs that are required to provide supply service. In
81 ComEd's next formula rate case the Commission should require ComEd to perform a
82 fully embedded cost study designed to assign a portion of the non O&M costs to the
83 supply function. In the meantime, in this proceeding, the Commission should increase
84 the costs allocated to the supply function for these non-O&M costs. Such an allocation
85 would provide parity competitive neutrality between ComEd's default supply and retail
86 electric service provided by Retail Electric Suppliers ("RES"). Without this allocation,
87 default rates discriminate against switched customers and include non-comparable costs
88 because, in part, customer are at risk for paying twice for the same service – once through
89 distribution and a second time through their respective RES charges.

90 **Q: Do you recommend that ComEd be disallowed from recovering any of the**
91 **reasonable and prudently-incurred costs that they incur in the provision of default**
92 **service?**

93 A: No. It is my testimony that ComEd's costs must be recovered through an appropriate
94 allocation that avoids customers paying multiple times for service; ComEd should be
95 allowed to recover its appropriate costs, in an appropriate manner.

96

97 **II. BENEFITS OF COMPETITION**

98 **Q. Do all customers benefit from competitive electricity markets?**

99 A. Yes. There are many benefits that all customers receive as a result of competitive retail
100 electricity markets. First, competitive markets offer choices to customers beyond the
101 standard variable default rate product. Those choices include products bundled with
102 other products and services, time of use rates, demand response products, green products,
103 hedged products, fixed price options and flat billed products, to name a few. This
104 diversity of offerings allows customers to enroll in products that are better able to suit
105 their needs. Second, having a diverse range of suppliers serving customers in ComEd's
106 service territory creates liquidity in the market which puts price pressure on wholesale
107 electricity prices, ultimately leading to lower retail electricity prices for default service
108 and choice customers. Third, having multiple entities transacting business in Illinois
109 creates jobs in the state and improves the state economy. Fourth, competition drives
110 innovation and efficiencies that leak out into the market, not only to other RES in the
111 market, but making the utility more efficient as well. In short, competition greatly
112 benefits all customers (including default customers) and that is why competitive markets
113 are generally the favored means to deliver goods and services to customers in our society.

114 Further, the Illinois legislature recognized the benefits of competitive retail electric
115 markets and that is why the legislature enacted legislation that enables the development
116 of competitive retail electric markets. *See, for example, Section 16-101A of the Public*
117 *Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/16-101A)*

118 **Q. In a competitive market, why is it important that both regulated and non-regulated**
119 **products are treated equally?**

120
121 A. Competitive parity is important in any competitive market for products and services.
122 Without competitive parity, innovation that is created by competitive forces in the market
123 is severely restricted. If one product is granted favorable legal or regulatory treatment, or
124 otherwise has an anti-competitive advantage in the market, all else being equal,
125 customers will be more likely to purchase or enroll in that product. Thus, the favored
126 product will have less pressure to innovate and become more efficient, and other products
127 that are not advantaged will be pushed out of the market.

128 **Q. Does the current regulatory construct create competitive parity for all products and**
129 **services in the market?**

130 A. Absolutely not. The default service product is granted favored regulatory treatment at
131 the expense of all other competitive retail electric service products in the market. First,
132 there are a number of actual costs, recovered through distribution rates that are utilized
133 to support the default rate product—such as customer care costs—but RES products do
134 not receive that same support. Second, ComEd’s default supply also obtains an
135 advantage because all customers are automatically assigned to that product when they
136 enroll. Assignment of customers by default to ComEd default service ensures that the
137 default rate maintains a significant portion of the market share, even when there are a
138 multitude of other products and providers available in the market. Finally, ComEd’s

139 supply charges do not include substantial regulatory and delivery charges, but rather
140 those costs are recovered through distribution rates. However, RESs also have
141 substantial regulatory and compliance requirements that they must recover through
142 their supply charges. Those requirements include contacts requirements, verification
143 requirements, notice requirements and a number of other consumer protection rules.
144 Compliance with these rules and requirements comes at a substantial cost to RESs—
145 and again, the RESs’ supply charges must recover those costs, while ComEd’s supply
146 charges do not. Consequently, the current paradigm leads to a non-comparable and
147 discriminatory default rate product. These rates discriminate against customers
148 electing to take service from a RES, requiring such customers to pay for costs twice,
149 once through distribution rates and again through rates charged by a RES.

150 **Q. How does the incorrect allocation of customer care costs to distribution rates**
151 **negatively impact competition?**

152 A. If utility is allowed to recover customer care costs through its distribution rates,
153 competition will be discouraged, because a choice customer would pay twice for those
154 charges – once through its utility distribution charges and a second time through its RES
155 supply charges. It is simply a matter of assuring that costs are recovered through the
156 correct “buckets”. Failure to do that creates a favored product that would have an anti-
157 competitive advantage, ultimately harming all ComEd customers.

158 **III. Customer Care Costs**

159 **Q. Has the Commission recognized that ComEd may be recovering customer care**
160 **costs that are attributable to the supply function through distribution rates?**

161 A. Yes. In Docket No. 13-387, ComEd claimed that no customer care costs should be
162 allocated to the supply function. The Commission rejected ComEd’s claim, stating,
163 “ComEd’s assertion that there are no customer care costs attributable to its supply
164 customers is equally suspect... The record in this case identifies that there may be
165 customer care costs that are attributable to the supply function and should therefore be
166 allocated to the supply function to adhere to cost causation principles.” Consequently,
167 the Commission directed ComEd to submit an updated allocation study in its next
168 formula rate case (Order in Docket 13-0387, page 57). It is appropriate to allocate
169 customer care costs necessary to support the supply function, to the supply function, in
170 order for there to be comparable and non-discriminatory rates.

171 **Q. Has ComEd complied with the Commission’s directive in Docket No. 13-0387?**

172 A. Not exactly. In response to the Commission’s directive, ComEd provided three studies
173 (Allocation, Alternative, and Switching). The Switching Study is substantially the
174 same avoided cost study that the Commission effectively found suspect in Docket 13-
175 0387 and, for the same reasons, should be rejected. The Alternative Analysis looks at
176 only one type of customer care cost and should also be rejected. The Allocation Study
177 is useful as a starting point for an appropriate embedded cost study, but suffers from
178 the flawed premise that customer care costs are related to only O&M expense.² As
179 Mr. Donovan stated, “I identified the costs to be reviewed for the purposes of the studies
180 as the 2013 O&M costs that were submitted as part of this proceeding and which were
181 incurred by the various ComEd departments that provide customer services, as described
182 in more detail below.” The Commission has previously acknowledged that customer care

² “The starting point for both the Allocation Study and the Switching Study is the identification of the embedded customer care costs for 2013.” ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 40 (Donovan Direct).

183 costs may be much broader and may include the costs associated with the full revenue
184 requirement amount, including direct O&M, indirect O&M, and capital costs. *See Case*
185 *No. 08-0532 Order, pp. 67-69.* By limiting its studies to a review of O&M-related
186 customer care costs, the starting point in each of the studies, including the Allocation
187 Study, is understated.

188 As discussed below, I recommend that the Commission utilize the Allocation Study, as
189 adjusted by the corrections described in my testimony, to allocate approximately \$34
190 million of ComEd's customer care costs to the supply function in this proceeding.
191 However, the Commission should also direct ComEd to undertake a fully embedded cost
192 of service study of its customer care costs in its next formula rate proceeding. These costs
193 are not insignificant.

194

195 **IV. The Allocation Study**

196 **Q. Notwithstanding ComEd's failure to include all customer care costs in its studies, do**
197 **you accept the Allocation Study provided by ComEd?**

198 A. No. After starting with an understated total amount of customer care costs, ComEd's
199 study incorporates allocation factors to assign customer care costs to the delivery and
200 supply function, which understate the amount of such costs that should be allocated to the
201 supply function. Moreover, ComEd's calculations are largely a matter of self-reporting;
202 therefore the burden should be on ComEd to provide evidence why its calculation of
203 customer care costs is reasonable. In discovery, RESA requested workpapers and
204 supporting analysis for ComEd's Studies. The only document that ComEd provided was
205 an excel spreadsheet for each study that vaguely indicates the categories of costs that
206 ComEd reviewed and the allocation factor that was applied to the cost. With such scant

207 evidence, the presumption should be that ComEd has understated the amount of
208 customer care costs to be allocated to the supply function.

209 **Q. Can you describe your concerns with ComEd's allocation factors?**

210 A. Yes. To understand ComEd's Allocation Study, a closer examination of the Allocation
211 Study is necessary. For many departments/categories, the Allocation Study did not in
212 fact specifically review all customer care costs (for example, IT related costs). It often
213 reviewed a portion of its customer care costs and extrapolated total department/category
214 values based upon allocators. In other categories, for example, Call Center Costs,
215 ComEd allocated costs are based upon whether it believed customer calls were related to
216 delivery or supply.

217 **Q. How did ComEd determine what calls were related to delivery and supply?**

218 A. First, ComEd created several categories for different types of calls.

219 **Q. What did ComEd do after dividing all calls into different categories?**

220 A. After ComEd determined its categories of calls, ComEd immediately removed any
221 categories that—in its sole judgment—were exclusively related to the delivery function.
222 ComEd then determined that zero percent of those costs should be allocated to the supply
223 function. For example, for roughly 40% of the line items analyzed for the customer
224 contact center, 100% of those costs were assumed to be distribution function costs.

225 **Q. Did ComEd allocate 100% of any costs directly to the supply function?**

226 A. No. Although ComEd removed 100% of the costs it determined related solely to the
227 distribution function, ComEd applied allocation factors for the costs ComEd determined
228 relate to the supply function. Thus, ComEd applied set percentage allocators (Revenue
229 Allocator 77.2% to delivery, Bill Allocator 81.8% to delivery, Bill Calculation Allocator
230 83.3% to delivery, and Company Allocator—a department specific amount) to various

231 services/activities provided within each category/department that relates to the supply
232 function.

233 **Q. What was the effect of applying the delivery function allocators?**

234 A. The delivery function allocators allocated a majority of the remaining costs to distribution
235 rates, based on the allocator percentage. ComEd determined that costs not allocated to
236 distribution should be allocated to the supply function. For example, ComEd directly
237 reviewed 4,418,431 calls, and, after applying the allocators determined that 87.6% of the
238 4,418,431.85 in calls should be attributed to the delivery function. Because there were a
239 number of calls that ComEd could not assign to a category, it applied the 87.6% allocator
240 to those calls as well.³

241 **Q. How did ComEd allocate Customer Call Center costs after determining what
242 percentage of calls it believed were allocable to delivery and supply?**

243 A. ComEd then used the 87.6% percentage and applied it to the \$37,987,643 in Customer
244 Contact Center costs to determine the total amount of Customer Contact Center costs to
245 allocate to delivery and supply. Thus ComEd allocated roughly \$33.3 million of its
246 Contact Center costs to the delivery function and only \$4.7 million to the supply function.

247 **Q. Are there problems with the way ComEd developed the revenue allocation factor
248 that cause ComEd's Allocation Study to understate customer care costs allocable to
249 the supply function?**

250 A. Yes. The allocation factors ComEd uses do not give proper weight to the costs that
251 should be allocated to the supply function. After pulling out the costs ComEd determined
252 are 100% allocable to the delivery function, ComEd then applies an allocation factor to

³ “[W]e determined the Contact Center Allocators – the overall weighted average of the items that could be assigned to delivery or supply using the three steps previously outlined in this response – to those calls for which specific descriptions were not available.” ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 53-54 (Donovan Direct).

253 the functions that relate to supply which has the effect of allocating a significant portion
254 of the costs of the activities that relate to the supply function to delivery. ComEd claims
255 that it applied the revenue allocation factor “to costs when the underlying work could be
256 considered to be driven primarily by revenues, such as Revenue Management
257 disconnection activities.”⁴ ComEd stated that “The Revenue Allocators are developed
258 based on ComEd’s delivery and supply revenues for 2013, and are set at 77.2% for the
259 delivery function and 22.8% for the supply function.”⁵ ComEd’s calculation, however, is
260 flawed and vastly different from the Revenue Allocation calculation in its 2010 case,
261 which allocated 39% of customer care costs to the delivery function, for reasons I
262 describe below. Not only is the calculation inconsistent with the 2010 study, it is also
263 inconsistent with the Revenue Allocation in the Switching Study that ComEd presented
264 in this proceeding. A snapshot of the calculation ComEd utilized in the Switching study
265 is provided below (emphasis added in highlight).

266 ***Figure MW-1.***

⁴ ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 42 (Donovan Direct).

⁵ ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 42 (Donovan Direct).

ComEd Call Center 2013 CSR Call Volumes & OTD Data					Docket No. 14-XXXX		
Group	Category	Description	Offered Calls	Handled Calls	Used in Analysis	Designation	% Distribution
Billing	Balance	Activity Statement_Spa	2,754	2,594	2,594	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Check Balance/Account_Com	7,927	7,124	7,124	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Check Balance/Account_Res	87,517	84,480	84,480	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Check Balance/Account_Spa	29,704	27,130	27,130	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Dispute Bill_Com	9,961	9,577	9,577	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Dispute Bill_Res	17,227	16,821	16,821	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Paperless Billing Opt_Spa	1,423	1,297	1,297	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Balance	Payment Verification_Spa	5,864	5,580	5,580	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Budget	Budget Billing_Com	440	410	410	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Budget	Budget Billing_Res	15,265	14,898	14,898	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Budget	Budget Billing_Spa	129	120	120	Bill Calculation	81.8%
Billing	Credit	Deferred / Installments_Com	877	762	762	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Deferred / Installments_Res	92,315	88,247	88,247	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Deferred / Installments_Spa	8,653	8,267	8,267	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Early Contact Residential	474,037	456,619	456,619	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Early Contact Spanish	33,346	31,763	31,763	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Extension_Com	1,305	1,219	1,219	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Extension_Res	44,535	43,254	43,254	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Extension_Spa	2,885	2,781	2,781	Revenue Allocation	70.3%
Billing	Credit	Moving CNP	468	454	454	Revenue Allocation	70.3%

267

268 Donovan Workpaper supporting ComEd Ex. 7.05 Switching Study, Tab 2014 Call Center
 269 Transactions.

270 **Q. Why do you disagree with ComEd’s calculation of the Revenue Allocation?**

271 A. ComEd indicates that the Revenue Allocation is used when the work is driven by a type
 272 of revenue. Thus, ComEd appears to indicate that the allocation factor is a result of a
 273 proportion of its supply revenues compared to distribution revenues. But, ComEd’s
 274 calculation does not reflect that relationship. Rather, ComEd has included purchase of
 275 receivables revenue related to RES in its calculation of distribution revenues, which
 276 skews the weighted average toward the delivery function. Below is an example from
 277 ComEd’s work-papers that shows this misallocation.

278 **Figure MW-2.**

Retail Designation	Customer	2013	2013
		Distribution Base Rate Revenue	Supply Base Rate Revenue
R: Residential		\$1,431,126,052	\$641,590,683
N: Nonresidential (1)		\$1,202,749,848	\$475,543,740
A: All Other (2)		\$36,567,087	\$11,560,973
PORCB Receivables		1,152,210,308	-
Total		\$3,822,653,295	\$1,128,695,396

2013 Revenue Allocator	77.2%	22.8%
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279

280 **Q. What are PORCB Receivables?**

281 A. PORCB receivables are all of the charges that choice customers pay for the electric
 282 supply service that a RES provides. Thus PORCB receivables represent the RES supply
 283 charges customers see on the ComEd bill.

284 **Q. Is it appropriate to include the PORCB receivables in the revenue allocator
 285 calculation?**

286 A. No. The PORCB revenues represent the revenues generated by RESs for the supply
 287 service they provide customers. Thus, the PORCB revenues are inappropriately included
 288 in ComEd’s revenue allocator calculation. The allocator should only take into
 289 consideration the supply and distribution revenues that can be attributed to the services
 290 provided by ComEd.

291 **Q. How should Mr. Donovan’s calculation of the Revenue Allocation be corrected?**

292 A. It is simple. The purchase of receivables should be removed from the calculation. That
 293 would result in a Revenue Allocation Factor of 70.3% to distribution rates. Interestingly,
 294 ComEd appears to have used this same number in the Switching study that is excerpted in
 295 my table above (highlighted as 70.3%). The 70.3% represents the total revenues ComEd

296 receives for providing distribution and supply service to customers. The 70.3% is a
 297 conservative calculation because it merely compares default generation supply revenues
 298 to the total distribution revenues from both default and RES customers. It could be
 299 argued that the more accurate calculation would compare supply revenue and distribution
 300 revenue of only default service customers. This calculation would cause the Revenue
 301 Allocator to allocate 40% of costs to the delivery function, which is more consistent with
 302 the Revenue Allocation presented by ComEd in 2010. See Donovan Ex. 7.04 Workpaper
 303 2010 Revenue Allocator.

304 **Q. What happens when you remove the PORCB revenue from the revenue allocator**
 305 **calculation?**

306 A. The calculation is provided below, as well as in my updated version of Mr. Donovan's
 307 workpaper for ComEd Ex. 7.04.

308 *Figure MW-3.*

Retail Designation	Customer	2013 Distribution Base Rate Revenue	2013 Supply Base Rate Revenue
R: Residential		\$1,431,126,052	\$641,590,683
N: Nonresidential (1)		\$1,202,749,848	\$475,543,740
A: All Other (2)		\$36,567,087	\$11,560,973
PORCB Receivables		-	-
Total		\$2,670,442,987	\$1,128,695,396
2013 Revenue Allocator		70.3%	29.7%

310

311 **Q. Are there also problems with the way ComEd developed the Bill Allocator that is**
 312 **utilized in ComEd's studies?**

313 A. Yes. ComEd stated that the “Bill allocator is utilized for costs related to determining or
314 explaining the line items on a bill and costs for work performed in calculating bills issued
315 by ComEd.”⁶ ComEd determined that because 2 of 11 lines on the bill relate to supply, it
316 should allocate 81.8% for the delivery function and 18.2% for the supply function.
317 ComEd’s calculation is flawed because not all lines on a bill are created equally. For
318 example, in my experience, customers usually call a RES to ask about the big ticket items
319 on the bill, i.e. the supply charges, which compose approximately 60% of the bill.
320 ComEd’s response to Staff’s discovery request 1.02 also supports this principle:

321 Staff: “Does ComEd currently track or has it ever tracked whether calls,
322 questions, concerns, or complaints from customers received by ComEd’s
323 call center are related to supply charges or delivery services charges?”
324

325 ComEd: “No, ComEd’s Call Center does not track whether calls are
326 related to supply or delivery service charges. Most customers that call
327 ComEd with billing concerns call because of the total bill amount and
328 not just one part of the bill. ComEd does not have its agents make a
329 subjective judgment about why the bill is high”⁷
330

331 (emphasis added). Given that the Bill Allocator is utilized in instances where a utility
332 representative may be explaining items on the bill, it is arbitrary that ComEd proposed to
333 allocate 81.8% of these costs to the delivery function. Further, customer are likely to
334 experience a high bill because of usage-sensitive supply charges, not other costs, like
335 distribution charges which do not change month-to-month or with usage

336 **Q. How would you correct ComEd’s Bill Calculator allocator?**

337 A. Recognizing that approximately 60% of a customer’s charges are related to supply, I
338 think a conservative calculation would follow my corrected Revenue Allocation

⁶ ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 42 (Donovan Direct).

⁷ RESA Ex. MW 1.2 (containing ComEd response to Staff Request NO. PR 1.02) (emphasis added).

339 methodology. Thus, I believe that the Bill Calculator Allocator should, at a minimum,
340 allocate 70.3% to the delivery function and 29.7% to the supply function.

341 **Q. Are there other problems with the way ComEd developed the Bill Calculation**
342 **Allocator that cause ComEd’s studies to understate customer care costs allocable to**
343 **the supply function?**

344 A. Yes. Similar to the Bill Allocator, ComEd calculated the Bill Calculation Allocator
345 based upon the amount of surface area on the bill occupied by supply and delivery
346 charges. Under this calculation, ComEd determined ComEd allocated 83.3% for the
347 delivery function and 16.7% to the supply function. I do not think ComEd correctly
348 devised this allocator, because, as stated above, the majority of a customer’s billed
349 amount is driven by supply-related charges and not the amount of paper used in providing
350 the billed information. A more accurate calculation would follow the Revenue Allocator.

351 **Q. Are there other flaws have you identified in ComEd’s Allocation Study?**

352 A. Yes. Before even applying the incorrect allocation factor, ComEd pulled out a significant
353 number of costs and automatically assigned 100% of those costs to the distribution
354 function. For example, ComEd identified customer care costs that should be 100%
355 allocated toward the delivery function, but did not utilize a similar allocation of customer
356 care costs to the supply function. Moreover, because ComEd did not examine all
357 customer care costs, this flaw in the design ripples through ComEd’s entire model. To
358 make matters worse, ComEd provided little to no support for costs that it allocated
359 exclusively to the delivery function—or any function for that matter. As mentioned
360 above, RESA requested workpapers and supporting analysis for ComEd’s Allocation
361 Study. The only document that ComEd provided is an excel spreadsheet that vaguely
362 indicates the categories of costs that ComEd reviewed and the allocation factor that was

363 applied to the cost. But, even a quick review of this spreadsheet reveals that ComEd
364 directly allocated costs to the delivery function far too liberally. Illustrative examples are
365 identified below.

366 **Q. Can you provide an example of a cost that ComEd did not correctly allocate to the**
367 **delivery function?**

368 A. Yes. ComEd has directly allocated 100% of the cost of customer calls to turn on electric
369 service to the delivery function.⁸ Further, ComEd allocates 100% of the costs related to
370 calls that discuss moving within the ComEd service territory. Yet, 100% of the customers
371 who either request electric service or move to a new location are required to take default
372 supply service from ComEd. Further, even after enrolling in default service initially, a
373 significant percentage of those customers remain on default supply service. In fact one of
374 the greatest anti-competitive advantages given to the default rate is that all customers are
375 assigned to the default rate, by default. Thus, it would be is inappropriate, anti-
376 competitive and arbitrary to allocate 0% of the moving and new enrollment costs to the
377 default rate when the default rate gets 100% of the benefit of customers that must receive
378 service from the default rate upon new enrollment and subsequent moves.

379 **Q. Are there other misallocations of costs to the delivery function that you have**
380 **identified?**

381 A. Yes. ComEd incorrectly attributes 100% of a number of the costs of a number of other
382 items to the delivery function. For example, ComEd allocates 100% of the calls that
383 relate to meter reads to the delivery function. However, customers calling in about a
384 meter read obviously have concerns about their electric consumption and their supply
385 charges. Thus a portion of these costs should be attributed to the supply function.

⁸ 7.04 Workpaper, 2014 Call Center, Line 64.

386 Further, ComEd allocates 100% of the costs of account maintenance to the delivery
387 function. However, there is a percentage of a customer's account that relates to supply
388 service. Thus, a portion of those costs should be assigned to the supply function.
389 Attached to my testimony as RESA Exhibit MW 1.1 are the modifications I made to
390 ComEd's allocation methodology⁹ that allocate the appropriate costs to the supply
391 function and to the delivery function.

392 **Q. What is the result of fixing ComEd's incorrect allocation of costs to the Distribution**
393 **function and fixing the incorrect allocating factors applied by ComEd.**

394 A. After fixing the incorrect allocations as described above the total amount ComEd should
395 have allocated to the supply function based on its own study is \$26,751,652. Exhibit
396 MW-1.1 attached to this testimony further details my calculations. An updated table of
397 my calculations is provided below

398 ***Figure MW-4***

⁹ ComEd produced a combined workpaper to support its 2010 and 2014 Allocation Studies. RESA Ex. MW 1.1 reflects modifications to the portion of the workpaper that pertains to the 2014 Allocation Study (ComEd Ex. 7.04). Thus, pages in RESA Ex. MW 1.1 that are labeled July 2014 contain modifications to the workpaper related to the 2014 Allocation Study. Pages in RESA Ex. 1.1 that are labeled April 2014 relate to ComEd's 2010 Allocation Study; RESA did not modify those pages.

Line No.	Department / Activity	Costs Analyzed	Costs Allocated to Supply	Costs Allocated to Delivery
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Metering Services (1)	61,752,262	-	61,752,262
2	Advertising (1)	-	-	-
3	Subtotal	\$ 61,752,262	-	\$ 61,752,262
4	Field and Meter Services	12,056,540	150,460	11,906,080
5	Billing	7,506,221	1,840,131	5,666,090
6	Customer Contact Center	37,987,643	13,421,508	24,566,135
7	Customer Relations (4)	1,063,461	232,282	831,180
8	Large Customer Solutions	9,054,583	90,546	8,964,037
9	Revenue Management	28,007,976	3,113,500	24,894,476
10	Revenue Protection	2,291,422	395,301	1,896,121
11	Demand Management	4,510,803	667,166	3,843,637
12	Electric Supplier Services (3)	-	-	-
13	Market Research	-	-	-
14	Information Technology	27,971,046	6,507,633	21,463,413
15	Support Services	8,318,780	-	8,318,780
16	Other (2)	2,886,899	333,126	2,553,774
	Total Analyzed	\$ 141,655,375	\$ 26,751,652	\$ 114,903,723
	Subtotal of Departments	\$ 203,407,637	\$ 26,751,652	\$ 176,655,985
	Grand Total of Study	\$ 203,407,637	\$ 26,751,652	\$ 176,655,985

399

400 **Q. What percentage of the total customer care O&M does \$26,751,652 represent?**

401 A. ComEd Exhibit 7.04 references that ComEd had \$203,407,637 in total O&M expenses.
402 Thus the allocation to the supply function that I have calculated only accounts for 13.15%
403 of ComEd's total O&M customer care costs. This is despite the fact that 60% of the
404 customer's bill is generation related. In my opinion, the \$26,751,652 represents a
405 conservative calculation of the customer care costs that should have been identified in the
406 Allocation Study to be allocated to the supply function.

407 **V. OTHER CUSTOMER CARE COSTS**

408 **Q. Are there other customer care costs, other than O&M costs, that should be allocated**
409 **to the supply function?**

410 A. Yes. In order for ComEd to perform customer care functions ComEd is required to have
411 fixed assets. For example the call center must have office space. Further, there is
412 equipment such as computers and telephones that are required for ComEd to operate its
413 call center. All of these assets are included in ComEd's rate base, and ComEd earns a
414 rate of return of 7.06% on these assets. This rate of return contributes to ComEd's
415 revenue requirement that ComEd recovers through distribution rates. However, ComEd
416 has not allocated any percentage of its rate of return generated from the customer care
417 assets to the supply function. Given that the customer care assets that ComEd recovers
418 through rate base are necessary to perform customer care functions for the supply service,
419 ComEd should allocate a portion of these costs to the default rate.

420 **Q. How much of ComEd's rate of return revenue requirement should be attributed to**
421 **the supply function?**

422 A. In this proceeding ComEd has not provided a list of its assets in base rates that are
423 required to support the customer care function. The Commission should order ComEd, in
424 its next formula rate proceeding, to produce a study that indicates the percentage of its
425 rate of return generated from its customer care assets that is appropriate to be attributed to
426 its supply function. In the meantime the Commission in this proceeding should allocate a
427 certain amount of dollars that represents rate of return generated from its customer care
428 assets that is appropriate to be attributed to the supply function. Because ComEd did not
429 provide details on its customer care assets, I was unable to include those costs in my
430 allocation estimates in my direct testimony. I reserve the right to address this matter
431 further in my rebuttal testimony.

432 **Q. Do you recommend that any other customer care costs should be attributed to**
433 **ComEd's default supply function?**

434 A. Yes. ComEd witness Menon proposed to recover \$7,332,000 in charitable contributions
435 through distribution rates. *See* Menon Direct Testimony at 46-47. First, I commend
436 ComEd for its charitable activities and encourage ComEd to continue its community
437 involvement. Second, I recommend that ComEd allocate 100% of these costs to the
438 supply function. To be clear, I am not recommending that ComEd cease these activities
439 or that the Commission should discourage ComEd from making charitable contributions.
440 Rather, I am recommending that these cost be allocated to the service that benefits most
441 from them. Because ComEd is a monopoly provider of distribution service, a customer
442 has no choice of distribution provider regardless of its opinion of ComEd. But customers
443 do have a choice between a RES and the default service. Charitable contributions
444 improve a utility's (or RES's) brand, instill good will and customer loyalty. Further,
445 RESs spend money on charitable and community investment but they are unable to
446 recover these costs through distribution rates. Accordingly ComEd's charitable
447 contributions and community investment should be recovered from default supply
448 customers. With the allocation of ComEd's charitable contributions to the supply
449 function, ComEd should allocate at least \$34,083,652 in customer care costs, including
450 charitable contributions, to the supply function.

451 **VI. REASONABLENESS OF RESA'S PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS**

452 **Q. Is the \$34,083,652 a conservative calculation as to the amount of costs that should be**
453 **attributed to the supply function?**

454 A. Yes it is. There are a number of costs that are required to support ComEd's supply
455 service that are not even considered in this calculation. For instance, ComEd allocates

456 almost zero dollars to the supply function for legal expense¹⁰ although ComEd must
457 expend significant amount of money on legal fees to ensure that the default product is
458 available in the market. Further, as I have already noted ComEd has allocated zero
459 dollars for office space, equipment or other capital costs necessary to support the supply
460 function. Also, ComEd does not assign any indirect costs that are required to support the
461 default rate including, administrative, HR, accounting, IT, auditing, office supplies etc.
462 In short the dollar amount I propose in my testimony is only a fraction of the dollars
463 recovered through distribution rates that are required to support the supply function.

464 **Q, Do you agree with Ms. Brinkman’s claim (Brinkman Direct Testimony at page 40)**
465 **that allocating customer care costs to the default supply rate could lead to a “last**
466 **man standing problem.”**

467 A. No, I do not. ComEd currently has 1,200,000 residential customers taking default
468 service. Assuming that each of these customers uses 800 kilowatt hours per month, that
469 would be 960,000,000 kwh per month. I have recommended allocating \$2,840,304 in
470 additional costs to the supply function per month. This would lead to a default service
471 supply price increase of only \$0.00295 (or less than 3 mils) per kwh. Further, because
472 ComEd’s allocation factors are a function of the default supply service revenue divided
473 by ComEd’s total distribution revenue, as customers migrate, ComEd default service

¹⁰ In discovery, RESA requested that ComEd identify all outside professional expenses that it incurred in 2013 and what amount it proposed to recover through distribution and supply rates. ComEd responded that it proposes to recover \$251,605,000 in outside professional expenses in this proceeding. *See* RESA Ex. MW 1.4 (containing ComEd response to RESA 2.07_Attach 1). Of that amount, it proposes to allocate \$187,000 in administrative and general contractor costs to the supply function. *See* RESA Ex. MW 1.3 (containing ComEd response to RESA 2.07(d) and (e)). Thus, ComEd proposed to allocate less than .1% (exactly 0.000743) in outside professional expenses to the supply function. Because this number does not seem reasonable or accurate, RESA requested that ComEd provide a detailed description of each incurred expense. ComEd, however, refused to provide the information, indicating that it is unduly burdensome. *See* RESA Ex. MW 1.3 (containing ComEd response to RESA 2.07(g) and (h)). It is unreasonable, however, that ComEd requests cost recovery of these expenses yet ComEd refuses to sufficiently detail the reason that these expenses were incurred. RESA will continue to pursue this matter and reserves the right to address this matter in rebuttal testimony.

474 supply revenue will decline which will in-turn result in fewer and fewer dollars being
475 allocated to the default supply function. Finally, even assuming the allocation amount
476 stays the same with increased migration (which it would not), if another 600,000
477 customers switched away from default rates, default supply rates would increase by only
478 \$.006 per kwh. So in sum, there is almost no risk of just a few remaining default rate
479 customers being forced to recover significant costs that are being allocated to the default
480 supply function.

481 **Q. Even though the last man standing problem is extremely unlikely, could the**
482 **Commission provide a safety net?**

483 A. Yes, if the Commission is particularly concerned about this issue, if at any point customer
484 care/charitable contribution-related costs that exceed 10% of the price to compare, the
485 Commission could direct ComEd to defer those costs with carrying charges for future
486 collection. If after one year, load does not return to default service sufficient to amortize
487 these deferrals, ComEd could file an application requesting authority to amortize the
488 deferred amounts through a non-bypassable charge.

489 **VII. SWITCHING STUDY AND ALTERNATIVE STUDY**

490 **Q. Do you agree with ComEd's claim that the Switching Study represents a more**
491 **accurate allocation of customer care costs?**

492 A. No, absolutely not. ComEd's claim is based upon the notion that its customer care costs
493 do not decrease as switching occurs. But, even if that is correct, there is a fundamental
494 problem with the switching study—it completely ignores the fact that RES must incur
495 similar costs and additional costs that ComEd has not identified as customer care costs. In
496 order for a RES to provide retail electric service a RES must incur substantial non-
497 commodity costs: it takes employees to schedule the delivery of electricity; it takes

498 employees for hedging and risk management; it takes call center infrastructure and
499 employees to maintain appropriate customer service; it takes outside and inside legal
500 personnel to comply with the regulatory rules and requirements; it takes IT employees;
501 it takes office space for all of those employees; it takes administrative and HR staff to
502 support those employees; it takes office supplies; it takes IT infrastructure; it takes
503 accounting and auditing services. This is just a non-exhaustive list of costs incurred by
504 RES to make a retail product available in the market; the point is though that it takes a
505 significant amount of additional (non-electric) expense for a RES to provide a retail
506 electric service product in the market, and unlike ComEd, RESs must recover these
507 costs through supply rates that are charged to RES customers.

508 **Q. Is the default rate product immune from incurring these expenses?**

509 A. No. The default rate product does not exist on an island. In order to make the default
510 rate product available to customers, ComEd must incur the same expenses listed
511 above. The only difference is that the default rate product is able to recover many of
512 these expenses through distribution rates and RES products do not, and cannot, recover
513 these expenses through distribution rates.

514 **Q. Why do you believe customer care costs should be allocated to the supply function
515 even if ComEd claims that these costs do not decrease with switching?**

516 A. If no customer care costs are allocated to the supply function, switched customers will
517 effectively pay for customer care costs twice—through distribution rates and through
518 their RES supply charges. Such a paradigm creates noncomparable and discriminatory
519 differences between default supply and RES supply rates. Moreover, it would provide an
520 unfair competitive advantage to the default supply product. For competition to thrive in
521 Illinois, it is critical that there is a level playing field, especially given that the default

522 supply rate already has a competitive advantage based on the fact that customers are
523 automatically assigned to the supply rate by default, and it takes an affirmative action,
524 (either via the customer individually or through governmental aggregation) for customers
525 to move away from the default supply rate.

526 **Q. Do you have a response to ComEd's claim that a portion of its customer care costs**
527 **are driven by RES products and pricing?**

528 A. Yes. ComEd appears to state that it received increased calls from RES customers in
529 winter of 2014. Initially, it is unclear why ComEd has included statistics from 2014,
530 given that its studies are all related to 2013. Moreover, ComEd has provided a one-sided
531 view of customer behavior. RES call centers often receive calls from customers during
532 outages and with respect to distribution rates. Thus RES call centers also incur costs to
533 take calls for services provided by ComEd. It would be inappropriate then to single out
534 the calls generated from RES customers to the ComEd call center, when RES call centers
535 incur costs from customers asking about distribution service.

536 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Feingold's claim that the Commission should adopt the**
537 **results in the Switching Study because only avoidable customer care cost should be**
538 **allocable to the supply function?**

539 A. No, I do not. Mr. Feingold's testimony and the Switching Study are built upon the
540 premise that if costs do not decrease when switching occurs, then such costs should be
541 allocated to the delivery function. Mr. Feingold, however, fails to address or
542 acknowledge at any point in his testimony that RES must also incur similar costs related
543 to their relationship with customers. Thus, whether a cost is avoidable or unavoidable
544 does not matter. If RES must incur customer care costs and recover such costs through
545 rates, and ComEd is permitted to recover its costs through distribution rates, the default

546 supply rate will have a competitive advantage. Indeed, the NYPSC rejected this same
547 argument, determining that the avoidability or unavailability of customer care costs is
548 irrelevant because recoverability of such costs through distribution rates would
549 undermine competition:

550 NYSEG excepts, arguing that it would not avoid any of the [customer care]
551 costs as customers migrate, that these customer costs should be assigned in
552 the same manner as credit and collection costs, and that these costs cannot
553 be avoided because they are mandated by law.
554

555 **As we have previously noted, the avoidability of the utility's**
556 **costs, in either the long- or short-run, does not necessarily determine**
557 **how the costs should be divided between competitive and non-**
558 **competitive services.** Indeed, if this were the standard and only short-run
559 avoidable costs were allocated to competitive services, there would be
560 neither lost revenues nor a need for a mechanism to collect them. **In**
561 **addition, the costs we are allocating will form the basis for competitive**
562 **utility rates,** and, if those rates do not fairly reflect the allocation of
563 supporting costs to each distinct service, the utility competitive rate could
564 be set at a subsidized level, **perhaps placing competitors at a distinct**
565 **disadvantage and impeding market development.** Accordingly, any
566 allocation method or theory that assigns none of the costs of credit and
567 collections, customer contact, and consumer affairs to the utilities'
568 competitive service may be especially suspect, unless persuasive evidence
569 to the contrary is submitted.¹¹
570

571 Thus, the NYPSC concluded that customer care costs “should be allocated by revenues
572 (roughly half to competitive and half to non-competitive services).” CASE 00-M-0504 –
573 Unbundling Track P. 20 (Aug. 25, 2004).

574 **Q, Mr. Feingold also implies that the Allocation Study (and Switching and Alternative**
575 **Studies) is based on an evaluation of fully embedded costs. Do you agree?**

576 A. No, I do not. Mr. Feingold states that ComEd’s Allocation Study is based on a review of
577 embedded costs, stating (“ComEd’s Allocation Study (*which is based upon an embedded*

¹¹ CASE 00-M-0504 – Unbundling Track P. 20-21 (Aug. 25, 2004).

578 *costing method*).¹² Based upon Mr. Feingold’s own definition and the generally
579 accepted definition of fully embedded cost, the Allocation Study is clearly not based
580 upon ComEd’s fully embedded customer care costs.

581 **Q. Please explain further.**

582 A. Mr. Feingold states that “[e]mbedded costing refers to a utility’s historically-based cost
583 of service (derived from actual accounting costs), which includes a fair rate of return on
584 the utility’s investments and its various operating costs. Embedded costs in this sense
585 represent the costs incurred by the utility to provide the existing level of utility service.
586 Embedded costs are sometimes referred to as “fully loaded” or “fully distributed” costs
587 because all costs associated with a particular service or function are identified for pricing
588 purposes.”¹³ Thus, an embedded cost study considers all necessary costs (plant,
589 intangible plant, capital, and O&M) to support a service. Mr. Donovan, however, the
590 architect of ComEd’s studies, indicated that the ComEd’s studies only evaluated O&M
591 costs.

592 **Q. Can you please describe customer care costs and their**
593 **categorization in more detail?**

594
595 *A. Yes. I identified the costs to be reviewed for the purposes of*
596 *the studies as the 2013 O&M costs that were submitted as part of*
597 *this proceeding* and which were incurred by the various ComEd
598 departments that provide customer services, as described in more
599 detail below.¹⁴
600

601 **Q. Mr. Feingold claims that, if the Commission makes a policy decision to allocate a**
602 **portion of customer care costs to the supply function, then the Commission should**
603 **rely upon the Alternative Study. Do you agree?**

¹² ComEd Ex. 8.0 at 27 (Feingold Direct) (emphasis added).

¹³ ComEd Ex. 8.0 at 8 (Feingold Direct).

¹⁴ ComEd Ex. 7.0 at 44 (Donovan Direct) (emphasis added).

604
605 A. No. I do not. Under the Alternative Study, Mr. Feingold concludes that only costs that
606 decrease with switching should be allocated to the supply function. Then, Mr. Feingold
607 concludes that the Switching Study concluded that Customer Contact Center costs do in
608 fact decrease as switching occurs; thus, the amount of costs identified by the Allocation
609 study should be allocated to the supply function. There are several problems with Mr.
610 Feingold's conclusion. First, Mr. Feingold ignores the fact that even though ComEd's
611 customer care costs may not decrease, RES must incur the same costs. Thus, as
612 discussed in detail above with respect to the Switching Study, his recommendation is not
613 competitively neutral. Second, as stated above, the Allocation Study is not in fact a fully
614 embedded cost study (it ignores capital, plant, and other indirect costs recovered in rate
615 base); thus, it understates the amount of Customer Contact Center costs that should be
616 allocated to the supply function. Third, even if the Commission were to accept Mr.
617 Feingold's recommendation to use the Alternative Study, it should not adopt his
618 recommended \$4.7 million allocation to the supply function, which is based upon the
619 incorrect allocation factors used by Mr. Donovan. Using my conservative corrections to
620 Mr. Donovan's allocation factors, the Alternative Study would allocate \$13,421,508 to
621 the supply function. Fourth, the Alternative Study does not account for the \$7,332,000 in
622 charitable contributions that ComEd has incorrectly allocated to the delivery function.
623 Thus, if the Commission considers the Alternative Study, at a minimum, the Commission
624 should allocate approximately \$20.8 million to the supply function.

625 **VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMENDATIONS**

626 **Q. Could you please summarize your recommendation?**

627 A. My recommendations are as follows:

- 628 • For the reasons explained in my testimony, the Commission should use the Allocation
629 Study as the starting point for allocating costs in this proceeding. However, that study
630 should be modified to account for the corrected allocation of costs and the corrected
631 allocation factors I discuss in my testimony. Accordingly, based on the corrected
632 Allocation Study \$34,083,652 should be allocated to the supply function.
- 633 • As I note in my testimony ComEd fails to include all embedded costs, such as the costs
634 of office space, IT infrastructure and other capital costs needed to support the customer
635 care function in its Allocation Study. These are significant costs that are required to
636 support the default rate and therefore a portion of these costs should be allocated to the
637 default rate. I recommend that the Commission require ComEd to perform a fully
638 embedded cost study designed to assign a portion of the embedded costs to the supply
639 function. The Commission should direct ComEd to file such a fully embedded cost
640 study in its next formula rate proceeding and should provide explicit directions and
641 parameters for that study. In the meantime, in this proceeding, the Commission should
642 allocate a certain amount of dollars to the supply function that represents rate of return
643 generated from its customer care assets.
- 644 • In its testimony ComEd submits a Switching Study and an Alternative Study to
645 mitigate the costs identified in the Allocation Study that should be allocated to the
646 supply function. As I explain in my testimony these studies dramatically under
647 calculate the customer care costs required to support the default supply function and
648 are based on the faulty premise that the default rate product should be able to utilize
649 distribution rate resources without being allocated any costs for those resources.
650 Accordingly the Commission should reject the Switching Study and the Alternative

651 Study presented by ComEd and assign customer care costs to the default rate based on
652 ComEd's Allocation Study, as corrected in the manner described in my testimony and
653 shown in RESA Ex. MW 1.1.

654 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

655 A. Yes, it does.

656