



% Change (from 2008 to 2023) in CO₂ Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in CO₂ emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their carbon-emitting power plants, carbon emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Additionally, competitive power markets are achieving this level of carbon reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, as are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering carbon emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some or all of the lost rate of return.


% Change (from 2008 to 2023) in SO₂ Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in SO₂ emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their carbon-emitting power plants, carbon emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Additionally, competitive power markets are achieving this level of carbon reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, as are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering carbon emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some or all of the lost rate of return.

% Change (from 2008 to 2023) in NO_x Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in NO_x emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their carbon-emitting power plants, carbon emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Additionally, competitive power markets are achieving this level of carbon reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, as are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering carbon emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some or all of the lost rate of return.