


Inflation-Adjusted Weighted Average Percentage Price Change by Customer Class, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2024

Figure 12 of Restructuring Recharged

Source: EIA-861M



The information presented in this document represents the views of RESA as an organization and may not necessarily reflect the views of any particular RESA member.

The difference in risk allocation between monopoly and choice regimes is manifested most clearly in the divergent electricity price trends during the flat-load era since 2008. This figure shows the aggregate inflation-adjusted percentage changes in weighted average prices of delivered supply for the groups of 14 choice jurisdictions and the 35 monopoly states from 2008 through 2024. It also shows stunningly different price trends in the competitive jurisdictions compared to the monopoly states from 2008 through 2024. The inflation-adjusted weighted average prices in the group of 35 monopoly states have risen moderately concerning inflation, except for Industrial, which has decreased slightly. By contrast, in the 14 competitive markets, residential, commercial, and industrial inflation-adjusted weighted average prices have each dropped significantly.

Advocates for the monopoly model sometimes promote the notion that residential, small business, and non-profit customers, such as schools, are disadvantaged by choice. The assertion is that large commercial and industrial customers will reap most benefits and that competitive suppliers will “cherry-pick.” Opponents of retail choice argue that allowing large customers to leave utility service will necessarily drive-up costs for the remaining customers. That may be true in a monopoly state with a commission-approved revenue requirement. However, the data show that prices for residential customers in competitive retail markets have been on a favorable track alongside the benefits that have accrued to C&I customers (all customers benefit, although the non-residential customers benefit more). While percentage changes in price differ among the customer classes in both the monopoly and choice states, this is partly due to the greater volumes and more constant demand characteristics of larger customers. Additionally, the costs of delivery services allocable to residential and small business customers constitute a greater share of the total price.

The divergence in price trends between the group of states that have incorporated competitive markets and the group that has remained under monopoly regulation is neither accidental nor aberrational. It is a function of entirely different public policies that prescribe quite different ways supply prices are set, and risks are borne. Traditional regulation sets supply prices based on past capital investment and current operation costs, with little regard for the actual economic value of the product. In competitive markets, supply prices are set by supply and demand dynamics.

The problem for consumers served by monopoly utilities in the flat-load era is more than just one of poor risk allocation. Traditional regulation necessarily sends inaccurate price signals. Because traditional rate setting is largely retrospective, prices will tend to be set too high in periods of surplus to recover investment in power plants producing less power than anticipated. Similarly, traditional regulation distorts price signals, including setting prices too low in periods of impending shortage and too high in periods of surplus. This upside-down pricing is resulting in rising prices in monopoly states. At the same time, customers are restraining their electricity consumption from the grid. In choice jurisdictions, all customers have a clear line of sight to the economic value of electricity in wholesale markets. Price signals constitute some of the most valuable information for all stakeholders in a market. Accurate and timely price signals elicit efficient consumer and investor decisions. Poor price information encourages inefficient behavior.