


% Change (from 2008 to 2024) in CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments\* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their carbon-emitting power plants, carbon emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Meanwhile, competitive power markets are achieving this level of carbon reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, which are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering carbon emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

\*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some, or all, of the lost rate of return.


## % Change (from 2008 to 2024) in SO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in SO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments\* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their SO<sub>2</sub>-emitting power plants, sulfur dioxide emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Meanwhile, competitive power markets are achieving this level of sulfur dioxide reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, which are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering sulfur dioxide emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

\*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some, or all, of the lost rate of return.

## % Change (from 2008 to 2024) in NO<sub>x</sub> Emissions Attributable to Electric Generation



This information demonstrates that there is little discernable difference between the decrease in NO<sub>x</sub> emissions attributable to electric generation in competitive jurisdictions as compared to monopoly states. This is noteworthy because a common argument is that without securitization payments\* to a vertically-integrated monopoly as an incentive to shutter their NO<sub>x</sub>-emitting power plants, NO<sub>x</sub> emission reductions will not happen as rapidly. Meanwhile, competitive power markets are achieving this level of NO<sub>x</sub> reduction without providing a guaranteed rate of return on renewable assets, which are afforded to the IOUs in monopoly states. This data demonstrates that the market-based forces are equally effective at lowering NO<sub>x</sub> emissions without resorting to these two characteristics of the monopoly model.

\*: Securitization payments: If a power plant owned by an IOU (in a monopoly state) were to shut down before the projected life cycle (previously approved in the rate case), for reasons such as decarbonization efforts, the consumers would pay the IOU for a period to represent some or all of the lost rate of return.